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NTU-games and TU-games are often used as tools to analyze economic models. 
Legut eta/. (1994) investigated the properties ofTU-games associated with econo-
mies with ''land ." In this paper we especially give attention to the NTU-games 
connected with these kinds of economies . The main result is that equilibrium 
payoffs in the NTU-model are connected to equilibrium payoff in the TV-model 
by b-transfer, a concept introduced by Shapley (1%9) . <C 1995 Academic Press, Inc . 
I. INTRODUCTION 
We consider in this paper an exchange economy of Debreu type with 
only one commodity, land . This commodity is modeled by a measure 
space (L, 21l, v), wherein 03 is a <T-algebra of subsets of Land v: 2Jl ~ R + 
is a non-trival finite measure on L: 0 < v(L) < :x: (cf. Berliant (1982) and 
Dunz (1984)) . 
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Utilities are given as integrals of "utility density functions" J; over v-
measurable parcels C E 013: V;(C) = I c J; dv. 
An exchange economy with land ~ consists of 
a set of agents N, 
A 013-partition {AJ;eN of L, the initial endowments of the agents, 
a set {J;};eN of nonnegative bounded v-measurable functions 
J;: L- R+, the utility densities of the agents. 
A 013-partition of L is a collection subsets A; E (iJa such that 
v(A; n A) = 0 if i y6 j and v(U;eN A) = v(L). Utilities are given by 
U;(C): = I c J; dv for every parcel C E 013: 
To investigate these types of economies we introduce (cf. Legut et a/. 
(1992)) a transferable utility game (N, v<t) defined by 
v~;(S): = sup {.L J J; dv I {C;};es is a 013-partition of A(S) = U A;} 
iES C; rES 
and a non-transferable utility game (N, V~) with 
Vl(S) := { x E R 5 I there is a ~-partition {C;};e5 of A(S) withx; 
::::; f J; dv for all i E s}. 
c, 
In this paper we will prove a connection between the equilibrium payoffs 
of the TU-game (N, vl) and the NTU-game (N, V'€). 
The interpretation of the functions!; is different depending on the point 
of view we take. If we consider these functions from a TU-point of view, 
we are assuming that there is an exogeneously given medium, "money," 
by which utility can be transfered from one agent to another. Then the 
function values of J; have the dimension [$/m2], wherein $is a unit for 
the exogeneously given medium "money." The utility of a parcel C has 
the dimension[$]. If we take an NTU-point of view, the values off; have 
the dimension [p./ m 2], where [p.;] is the unit of subjective utility of player 
i. Then U;(C) = fc J; dv has the dimension [p.;]. We must assume that 
the preferences of agent i over parcels C determine the utility density J; 
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up to positive affine transformations (otherwise the integrals fc J; dv makes 
no sense). The utilities must be cardinally determined. 
There are more differences between both interpretations of the utilities. 
In an NTU-setting, e.g., an economy in which one player owns all the 
land (A; = L and Aj = 0 if j ¥- i) is trivial, as no trade can take place. In 
a TV-interpretation this economy is not trivial, as players j ¥- i can buy 
parcels from player i by means of "money." 
Further, the concept of competitive equilibrium is different in both 
contexts. In an NTV-setting a collection of \lJ.I-subsets X = {X;}iEN is a 
competitive equilibrium if there is a (price) density g: L- R+ such that 
(i) {X;};eN is a partition (the market clears), 




if f c /; dv > fx /; dv, then fc g dv > fA g dv (maximality con-
I I 
The NTU-equilibrium payoff associated with the competitive equilib-
rium {X;};EN is the N-vector x with coordinates X; : = fx J; dv for all agents 
iE N. I 
In a TV-setting condition (i) stays and condition (ii) disappears: there 
is no budget constraint, as "money" can be used to balance any difference 
between selling and purchasing. Condition (iii) becomes 
(iii)' fx (/; - g) dv 2: fc (/; - g) dv for every parcel C E \lJ.I (maxi-
mality). I 
The TV-equilibrium payoff associated with {X;};EN has the coordinates 
X;:= fx (/;-g) dv +fA g dv. 
I I 
Note that in condition (iii) only integrals of the same densities are 
compared with each other. In (iii)' the functions J; and g are subtracted 
and must therefore have the same dimension [$/m 2]. By the way, the 
dimension of gin the NTV-setting can be [·/m 2], where"·" stands for a 
numeral or any other unit of measurement. 
In this paper we are going to compare the TV- and NTU-equilibrium 
payoffs. We shall prove that these equilibrium payoff are connected by 
"b-transfer." 
First we recall the definition of the b-transfer of an NTV-game. Let 
(N, V) be an NTU-game and bE R':. The b-transfer of the game (N, V) 
is the TU-game tb(V) with values 
tiV)(S) = sup{(b, x) I x E V(S)}. 
The set {(b, x) I x E V(S)} is not always bounded for every coalition, but 
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if it is, the b-transfer can be defined. In Shapley (1969) the b-transfer of 
a game is used to define the Shapley value for NTV-games. A point x E 
V(N) is a point of the Shapley NTV-value if there is a transfer vector 
b E R~ such that the b-transfer tb(V) exists and (b;x;);eN is the Shapley 
value of the TV-game (N, tb(V)). 
Introducing a transfer vector b E R~ is the same as introducing an 
exchange rate between the utilities of different players. If (x1 , •••• xn) 
is a point of V(N), the vector b * x := (b;x;);eN is meant as a TV-payoff 
vector of which the coordinates are compared and added. So the dimension 
of the coordinate b; must be [·I /L;] or [$/ ILJ 
In this paper we prove that, under mild conditions on~. a vector x E 
V<t;(N) is an NTV-equilibrium payoff if and only if there is a nonnegative 
transfer vector b such that b * x is a TV-equilibrium payoff of tb(V'f:). 
Furthermore, tb(Vt:) is the TV-game associated with the economy b * ~. 
the economy with land, wherein each utility density fi is multiplied with b; . 
2. MAIN RESULTS 
As before we start with a measurable space (L, ~. v), wherein Lis a 
nonempty set, ~ is a <T-algebra of subsets of L, and v: ~ ~ R + is a finite 
non-trivial measure. 
An economy with land consists of a finite set of agents N, and for each 
agent i EN, a v-measurable initial endowment A; c Land a nonnegative 
(essentially) bounded v-measurable utility density fi on L. The integral 
U;( C) : = fc fi dv gives the appreciation of agent i for the measurable set 
C. We assume that the following conditions hold: 
(a) The measure v is non-atomic; i.e., for every set E E 00 with 
v(E) > 0 there is a subset F C E with FE~ and 0 < v(F) < v(E). 
(b) The utilities fi are almost everywhere positive: 
v({x E L I Ji(x) = 0}) = 0 for all agents i E N. 
(c) The economy 'i£ is non-trivial; i.e., at least two agents have an 
initial endowment of positive v-measure. An agent i with v(A;) = 0 is 
called a dummy. 
Let {X;};EN be a ~-partition of L. A coalitionS can improve upon {XJ;eN 
if there is a @-partition {Y;}iES of A(S) := uiES A; such that Iy. fi dv ;::: 
fx fi dv for all agents i E S and there is at least one strict inequality. 
A' coalition S can strictly improve upon {X;};EN if there is a ~-partition 
{YJ;Es of A(S) such that JY fidv > fx fi dv for all agents i E S. A ~­
partition {XJ;EN of L is Pareto optimal if the coalition N has no strict 
improvement upon {X;};eN. A ~-partition {XJ;EN of L is strictly Pareto 
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optimal if the coalition N has no improvement upon {XJ;eN. A CJ3-partition 
{X;};eN of L is a core allocation if no coalition S has a strict improvement 
upon {XJ;eN. It is a strict core allocation if no coalition S has an im-
provement. 
The following lemma states that in economies satisfying conditions (a) 
and (b) Pareto optimality is the same as strict Pareto optimality and the 
core is the same as the strict core. 
LEMMA l. If'& is an economy with land satisfying the conditions (a) 
and (b), then every improvement upon {X;};eN can be changed into a strict 
improvement. 
Proof. Let { Y;hes be an improvement of coalitionS upon {X;};eN. Then 
I y . J; dv =::: Ix J; dv for all agents i E S and there is a strict inequality for 
i0 'E S. ' 
By non-atomicity of v there is a subset E C Y;
0 
with positive v-measure 
and IE !4.! dv < Ir !;
0 
dv - Ix !;0 dv. By non-atomicity we can divide E 
'o 'y 
into s - l parcels E;, i E S\{i0J with positive v-measure. By the positivity 





with Z; : = Y; u E; for i E S, i >" 'i0 is a strict improvement of S. • 
In the proof we used the theorem of Lyapounov (1940) for the one-
dimensional case, saying that if (L, ~. v) is a non-atomic finite measure 
space, E E ~ is a v-measurable set, and f is an essentially bounded 
nonnegative v-measurable function, then for every real number {3 with 
0 :s; {3 :s; a : = IE f dv there is a v-measurable set F C E with IFf dv = {3 . 
It is the goal of this paper to characterize equilibrium payoffs by b-
transfer. In the following proposition we characterize, as a first step, the 
Pareto optimal allocations by b-transfer. 
PROPOSITION 2. A Cff3-partition {X;heN of L is Pareto optimal if and 
only if there exists a vector b E R~ such that b; > 0 if v(X;) > 0 and 
X; C' {x E L I b;J;(x) = maxjeN bjj(x)}. The notation E C' F means 
v(E\F) = 0. 
Proof If b is as in the proposition and { Y;};eN is a strict improvement 
upon {X;};eN, then 
L b;J J;dv< L b;J J;dvs; 2: J maxbjjdv= J maxbi~dv. 
iEN X; iEN Y; iEN Y; ;EN L JEN 
Since for (almost) all points x E X; b;J;(x) = maxiEN bi~(x), we find 
'i-;eNixb;J;dv = IL lb dv, wherelb = maxiEN bJj. Therefore, there is no 
strict improvement upon {X;};eN and {X;};eN is Pareto optimal. 
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Conversely, let {X;};eN be a Pareto optimal allocation. For agentsj with 
v(Xi) = 0, we define hi= 0. Let A be the set of agents i whose parcel X; 
has positive v-measure. For i, j E A , i ¥- j, we define a real number au 
by 
au:= infessx// Jj 
:=sup{! E R I the set {x EX; I //Jj(x) ::5 t} has v-measure zero}. 
Further we define a;; = I for all i E A. 
Claim l. For every pair (i, j), . i, j E A, we have au < :x:. 
If au= :x: then the sequence of v-measurable sets {x EX; I/;/ Jj(x) ::5 2n} 
has v-measure zero. Then also the set X;\f/ 1(0) has v-measure zero. By 
property (b) we find v(X;) = 0. 
Claim 2. If a- is a permutation of A, then niEA a i. u(i) 2:: l. 
It is sufficient to prove that ll;ec a;,u(iJ 2:: I for every cycle C of the 
permutation a- of length 2::2 . Without loss of generality we assume that 
C "" {l, 2, . .. , p} and a-(i) = i + l for i = I, .. . , p - I and 
a-(p) = l. Suppose that ll;ec a;,,.1;1 < l. Choose li;,uu> > a;.uu> such that 
ll;ec Zi;,,.1;1 = I. From the definition of au we infer that the sets 
E; : = {x E X; I !;I fu(i)(x) < ai.u (i)} have a positive v-measure for all i E c. 
Let e > 0 be a positive number such that TIJ= 1 aj.o-(J) IE /; dv 2:: e for i "" 
l , .. . , p. As v is atomless and /; is positive almost everywhere. there 
are subsets F; C E; with IF /; dv = (lli<i ai.u v)r 1 e for aU i E C. The integral 
I F fu(i) dv > a;~(i) I F /; dv' = fFoi ' f uw dv for all i E c. If we take Y; = 
I I II 
(X;\F;) U F 17 -11;1 fori E C and }j = Xi for j $. C we have an improvement 
upon {X;};eN and {X;};eN is not (strictly) Pareto optimal. 
Claim 3. There is a positive vector bE R1+ such that b/b; ::5 au for 
all i andj EA. 
Take x E R1+ arbitrarily and define the mapping cp:R~ + ~ RA by 
cp(x); : = miniEA xi ai;. As au > 0 for all i, j E A we have cp(x) > 0 and as 
a;; = l we have cp(x) ::5 x. Repeating the mapping cp we find a weakly 
decreasing sequence 
On the other side , if k >a := IAI, we find for each i E A 
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for some sequence t(O) = i, t(l), ... , t(k) E A. As k > a the sequence 
t(O), t(l), . . . , t(k) contains repetitions and therefore by Claim 2 we have 
cpk(x); 2:: cp1(x); for some I = /(i) < k. Therefore the sequence cpk(x) is 
constant fork 2:: a. We find a vector b : = cpa(x) > 0 with b; = min;eA b1a1; 
for all i EA. 
Now we can finish the proof as follows. For almost all points of X;, 
i E A, we have/;/ Jj ;;:: au 2:: b/ b;. Then, for agents i E A, b;/;(x) = maX;eA 
b1Jj(x) for almost every point of X;. We may replace max;eA by max;eN, 
as b1 = 0 when j $. A. For i $. A the equality b;/; = maX;eN b1Jj almost 
everywhere on X; is an empty condition. • 
If b E R ':. we introduce the notation 
-s I" fb = v b;Ji• 
iES 
I" • = 1\ f- N\ i J b. b • 
- iE.V 
where A;es bJ; and V ;es bJ; denote the pointwise minimum and maximum 
of the functions b;/;. (i E S). The function fb gives in every point the 
second highest value. -
If 't; = {N, {A;, /;};eN} is an economy with land, b * 't; is the economy 
with the same set of agents and initial endowments as in <t; but with utility 
densities {b;/;};eN instead of {/;heN . The economy ~ has the functions 
/; V f as utility densities. 
It Is typical for economies with land that the trades necessary to reach 
a reallocation {X;};eN can be reconstructed from the reallocation {X; heN. 
The parcels A; n X1 are sold by agent ito agentj and the payments (under 
a price regime g) are fA nx g dv. Therefore, it is not surprising that we 
need, in the proof of th'e fnain theorem, a theorem from the theory of 
flows. In fact we use the following theorem of Hoffman (1960). 
PROPOSITION 3 (Hoffman ( 1960)). If N is a finite set and L and Care 
N x N-matrices with L ::5 C, then the following statements are equivalent: 
(i) There is an N x N-matrix Y with L ::5 Y ::5 C and :L1.,; Y;; = 
L1.,; Y;Jor all i E N. 
(ii) For all subsets S C N we have L;es L;eN1s Lu ::5 L;es L;eN\S C1;. 
In the application of this proposition L;1 will be £;nx. [b dv and C;; will 
be fA nx ]b dv. The matrix coefficients Y;; are the int~grals fAnx g dv. 
If fb I ::51 g ::5 ]b the first condition of (i) is satisfied. The second 
part of (i) says that fAPXNv g dv = fAN,;nX; g dv. If we add fA;nX; g dv 
we find the budget equality fA g dv = fx g dv. 
After these preparations we 'formulate' the rather technical first version 
of the main theorem: 
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PROPOSITION 4. A '713-partition {X;};EN of L is an NYU-competitive 
equilibrium in the non-trivial economy <& if and only if there is a vector 
b E R':. with b =?- 0 such that 
(i) X; C' {x E L I b;J;(x) = Jb(x)}, 
(ii) LiES fx; Jb dv ~ L;Es fA; <Ji V [b) dv. 
Moreover, b; > 0 if v(A;) > 0. 
Proof. Let {X1tEN be an NTU-competitive equilibrium with price den-
sity g. Let b; be the infimum of the real numbers t such that the set {x E 
X, I g(x) ~ tJ;(x)} has v-measure zero: sup essx g/ J;. Note that b1 = 0 if 
v(X;) = 0. Let c1 := inf essL,X; g!J;, i.e., the supremum of the numbers t 
with the property that the set {x E L\X; I g(x) ~ (f;(x)} has v-measure 
zero. 
Claim l. 0 ~ b; ~ c; ~ oo for all agents i E N. 
Suppose that c; < b; for some agent i E N. Take b; and c; such that 
c1 < c;<b; < b;. The sets Y := {x EX; I g(x) ~ b,J;(x)} and Z := {x E 
L\X; I g(x) ~ Z';J;(x)} have positive v-measure. There is a measurable set 
E C Y with 0 < JE J; dv < fz J; dv because of the non-atomicity of v and 
J; > 0 almost everywhere in X;. From the same property we infer that 
there is a measur~le set F C Z with JE J; dv < JF J; dv ~ b;fc1 JE J; dv. If 
we replace X; by X; = (X1\E) U F we have fx J; dv > fx J; dv and 
I I 
( g dv ~ { b;J; dv > C; ( J; dv ~ ( g dv. )£ J£ JF JF 
Then g is not an equilibrium price for the competitive equilibrium {X;};EN. 
This finishes the proof of the claim. 
Claim 2. If b; = 0, then v(A1) = 0; if b1 = oo, then v(Aj) = 0 for every 
j =?- i. 
If b; = 0 for some player i E N, then g(x) = 0 for almost every point 
of X;. If v(X;) > 0, then every player j ¥- i has .fj > 0 almost everywhere 
on X;. This means that agentj can obtain X1 costless and his appreciation 
for X; is positive . Then ({X;}, g) is not a price equilibrium. Therefore, 
v(X;) = 0. If v(A1) > 0 (agent i is not a dummy), we have fx J; dv = 0 < 
fA J; dv and ({X;};EN, g) is not a price equilibrium. 1 
1
If b; = oo, we also have c, = oo. For every number t > 0 we have 
tJ;(x) ~ g(x) for almost every point of L \Xj. As g is essentially bounded, 
we find J; = 0 almost everywhere on L \X;. This means that v(L \X;) = 0 
or v(X) = 0 for every agentj =?- i. As before we conclude that v(A) = 0 
for all agents j =?- i. 
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In Claims I and 2 we proved that 0 :5 b; < oo for all agents i E N if the 
economy~ is not trivial. Further, b; > 0 if agent i is not a dummy. 
From the definition of b; we infer that, if i is not a dummy, bJ; ~ g 
almost everywhere on X; and from the definition of c; and Claim l we find 
bJj :5 c1Jj :5 g almost everywhere on X; for agentsj ~ i. This means that bJ; = ]b almost everywhere on X; and fb :5 g :5 ]b almost everywhere on L. - 0 
As fx g dv = fA g dv for all agents i E N (budget constraint) the matrix 
I I 
Yu = JA .nx g dv is a circulation flow with lower capacity Lu = JA .nx fb 
dv and upper capacity Cu = tnx Jb dv. By the theorem of Hoffman Jw-e 
find fA<SJnX(N\Sl [b dv :5 JA<N\S )~X<~J ]b dv for all S C N. Adding to both 
sides JA<SJnxcN,SJ ]b dv, we find fxcsJ ]b dv ~ JA<SJ q~ V [b) dv for all S C N , 
as almost everywhere on X(N\S) the function f~ :5 fb and on X(S) the 
0 - s - -functiOn f b = fb ~ fb. 
Conversely , if th-ere is a vector b satisfying the conditions of the theo-
rem, we prove that there is a bounded v-measurable function g such that 
I g dv = J g dv. 
X; A ; 
and 
If we define Lu and Cu as before, condition (ii) of Proposition 4 implies 
that the condition in the theorem of Hoffman is satisfied and there is a 
circulation flow Y = ( Yu) with Lu :5 Yu :5 Cu for all i ~ j. If Yu = 
A.;1Lu + (1 - A.u)Cu with A.u E [0, I], we define giA -nx. by (A.u[b + 
(1 - A.ulfb)IA;nx·Then [b :5 g :5 ]band tnx g dv = Yu.' On A; n X; the 
function g can Jbe chosen arbitrarily betwee'n fb and Jb. 
Finally, we prove that the price density g satisfies the maximality condi-
tion (iii). Let i be any agent and let C E ~ be a parcel of land with 
fc fi dv > fx fi dv. Then C\X; has a positive measure and bJ; :5 [b almost 
everywhere 'on C\X1• Further, b;Ji == ]b almost everywhere on X 1• 
Then we have, if b; > 0, 
~ J b1/; dv - I b;Ji dv > 0. 
C\X; X;\C 
If b; = 0, then v(X;) = 0 and fc\X g dv ~ fC\x [b dv > 0 if [b > 0 almost 
everywhere on C. This is clearly true if at least'two players have a positive 
coordinate in b. If the economy is not trivial, the price of Cis larger than 
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the price of X; (and of AJ. The function g is a price density to the ~­
partition {XJiEN. • 
Before we come to the final version of the main theorem we have to 
recall some results of Legut et al. (1994). 
(a) In Legut et al. (1994) it is proved that a ~-partition {XJiEN is a 
TV-competitive equilibrium if and only if, for all agents i EN, X; C' {x E 
L I /;(x) = ](x)}. As {X;}iEN is a ~-partition, the set Y; : = {x E L I /;(x) = 
J(x) > f(x)} C' X;. The equilibrium price can be any function between f 
and/. Condition (i) of Proposition 4 states that {XJiEN is a TV-competitive 
equilibrium in the economy b • '& . 
(/3) For an economy with land~ the TV-game u'l! as defined in the 
Introduction has the following values: 
u't(S)= J fSdv. 
ACSJ 
Rewriting condition (ii) we find for the right hand side 
L: I <li v Jb) dv = I <n v [b> dv = !.Jb;<i(S ), 
iES A; - ACSJ 
where b * '& is the economy with the same set of agents and initial endow-
ments as'& but with utilities b;]; V fb, i E N. Condition (ii) of Proposition 
4 says that {fx lb dv}iEN is a core element of the TV-game ub*f, . 
I 
(y) Finally, for a TV-competitive equilibrium {XJiEN, the price den-
sity g (arbitrarily chosen between/and/) determines the TV-equilibrium 
payoff -
X;:= J (/;-g)dv+ I gdv 
X; A; 
for all i EN 
completely. It is proved that {.x;};EN is a TV-equilibrium payoff if and only 
if .x E Core(lJi). Hence, as Jb = bJ; almost everywhere on X;, condition 
(ii) of Proposition 4 is equivalent with 
( b; I /; dv). is a TV-equilibrium payoff with respect to 
X; 1EN 
{X;}iEN in the economy b * '&. 
Summarizing we have 
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THEOREM 5. A C!A-partition {X;};eN is an NTV-competitive equilibrium 
of a non-trivial economy with land'& = {N, {A;, /;heN} if and only if there 
is a transfer vector bE R~ (with b; > 0 ifv(A;) > 0) such that 
(i) {X;heN is a TV-competitive equilibrium of the economy b * '&, 
(ii) b * (fx J; dv );eN is a TV-equilibrium payoff with respect to 
{X;};eN in the economy b * '&. 
For equilibrium payoffs we have 
COROLLARY. If'& is a non-trivial economy with land and xis an element 
ofVl(N), then xis an NTV-equilibrium payoff iff there is a transfer vector 
b E R~ (with b; > 0 if v(A;) > 0) such that b * x is a TV-equilibrium 
payoff in the economy b * '&. 
Proof. Let x E V~(N) and let bE R~ be a vector such that b; > 0 if 
v(A;) > 0 and b *xis a TV-equilibrium payoff of b * '&. 
As x E V<t:(N), there is @-partition {X;};eN such that X; :S fx. [; dv for 
all agents i E N. We prove that {XJ;eN satisfies the conditions of 
Theorem 5. 
If we multiply these inequalities with b; and sum over i E N , we 
find 
(b, x) :S 2: J b;/; dv. 
iEN X; 
Since b * x is a TV-equilibrium payoff in b * '&, we have in particular 
that (b, x) = vb•'I.(N) = JL Jb dv and therefore all inequ~lities in the preced-
ing formula are equalities: b;x; = fx b;/; dv = fx fb dv for all agents 
i E N. This means that X; C' {x E L I b;/;(x) '= ]b(x)} and {X;};eN 
is a TV-competitive equilibrium in b * '& by (a) (condition (i)). More-
over, b * x = b * <fx J; dv);eN is a TU -equilibrium payoff in the economy 
b * '& (condition (ii))'. • 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this final section we will answer three fundamental questions about 
the model we used in this paper. 1 
First the meaning of a TV-model and particularly ofTU-equilibria can 
be questioned. 
1 We are grateful to one of the referees who raised these questions. 
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(I) What is the meaning of TV-models and especially of TV-equilib-
ria? Are price equilibria without budget constraint not strange to all 
thinking about economies? 
Indeed, a TU-model needs many preassumptions to make sense. It 
assumes, e.g., that there is an externality like money, equally appreciated 
by all the agents, and that in the economy to be considered "money is 
not the problem'' or, to say it differently, every player must have enough 
"outside assets" to balance the difference between his buyings and his 
sellings. Under these circumstances it makes sense to fix a price that 
"clears the market" and gives after all the agents a payoff, partially in 
goods (land) and partially in money, that is as high as possible. This is 
exactly the TV-equilibrium concept we propose. In fact, there is some 
tradition in modeling economic situations by TU-games (see, e .g., the 
house market model of Shapley and Shubik (1972) and Kaneko (1976), 
(1982)). Finally this paper shows that TV-equilibria are tightly connected 
with economically not suspect NTU-equilibria. 
The second question raises the issue of how far a commodity like "land" 
differs from traditional commodities. 
(2) What is special to the commodity "land" compared with "nor-
mal commodities"? 
The main difference is the uniqueness of parcels of land. A parcel can 
be bought from the owner and from nobody else. This makes it possible 
to trace back who bought what parcel from whom after the trades are 
made. In an economy with normal commodities (like crude oil or milk) 
this cannot be done uniquely. In the paper we use this idea by comparing 
the trading behavior with a flow of goods and money. Loosely speaking, 
land can be seen as an overwhelming number of indivisible goods (the 
points of L) that can be traded only in some combinations (the measurable 
sets). 
The last question is about the kind of utility functions we considered. 
(3) What do the utility functions have the form they have? 
Indeed, a difficult commodity like land requires a more sophisticated 
utility function. In our first paper on this subject (Legut et al. (1992)) we 
referred to the Ph.D. dissertations of Berliant (1982) and Dunz (1984), 
wherein attempts are made to consider more general utility functions. 
But even the most general utility concept we know of (utility functions 
only continuous with respect to an atomless measure (Dunz (1984)) cannot 
deal with all the intricacies of a commodity like land. Here global geometri-
cal or topological concepts like shape of parcels, connectedness, or ]-
connectedness (there no enclaves owned by somebody else) play an im-
portant role. Therefore we used the simpler utility functions, as the more 
sophisticated ones are not doing the job better. 
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